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GLOBALIZATION REPORT CARDS FOR SECURITIES
REGULATORS: NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKET STANDARDS FOR
INFORMATION SHARING AND COOPERATION AND THE
PREVENTION OF FINANCIAL CRISES
Andrea M. Corcoran*

I. INTRODUCTION
The 2007–2009 credit crisis and the threatened breakdown of the
world’s financial system moved gaps in regulation, and the capacity of
international cooperation to fill those gaps, to the top of the agenda of
global leaders—both politicians and regulators. The rescue of the
financial regulatory community from its inability to anticipate, assess,
measure, and mitigate, if not prevent, toxic synergies among multinational financial services providers still burdens the public purse in
almost every jurisdiction. Indeed, although recovery appears to be on
the horizon, the lingering memory of the cost, and the assumed
inevitability, of that rescue continues to threaten the economy, the
policies, and even the incumbency of presiding policymakers and
regulatory institutions. 1
Multiple parties, both national and international, have offered a series
of reforms to cure the deficiencies leading to the crisis, including among
others: the G-20, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS), the European Commission (EC), the
United Kingdom (U.K.), and the United States (U.S.). 2 Notable among
* Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown Law Center; Principal, Align International, LLC.
1. See, for example, the planned reorganization of the UK Financial Services Authority (UK
FSA), to commence January 11, 2011 and conclude in 2012, which was part of the platform on which
the new Conservative Government campaigned. The proposed changes, now underway, transfer
prudential supervision back to the Bank of England (BOE). See Financial Regulatory Forum,
http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatory-forum/2010/07/26/factbox-uk-fleshes-out-financialsupervisory-shake-up/ (July 26, 2010, 12:48 EDT).
2. See, e.g., G-20 Leader’s Statement, The Pitt. Summit (Sept. 24–25, 2009), available at
http://www.pittsburghsummit.gov/mediacenter/129639.htm; INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL
FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: NAVIGATING THE FINANCIAL CHALLENGES AHEAD (2009), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2009/02/pdf/text.pdf; see also G-20, G-20 WORKING GROUP 3:
REFORM OF THE IMF: FINAL REPORT ¶¶ 18.4–18.6 (2009), available at http://www.g20.org/Documents/
g20_wg3_010409.pdf; THE DE LAROSIÈRE GROUP, THE HIGH-LEVEL GROUP ON FINANCIAL
SUPERVISION IN THE EU (2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/
de_larosiere_report_en.pdf; THE FIN. SERVS. AUTHORITY, THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY
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these proposals is that of the Financial Stability Board (FSB)—created
in April 2009 3 as a successor to the Financial Stability Forum (FSF)—to
RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS (2009), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/
turner_review.pdf; THE U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW
FOUNDATION (2009), available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf;
The White House Proposal, available at http://documents.nytimes.com/amendments-to-the-bankholding-company-act#document/p1;
H.R.
4173,
111th
Cong.
(2010),
available
at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills&docid=f:h4173enr.txt.pdf
(the so-called Volcker Rule or modified return to the Glass–Steagall limitations on proprietary trading
within deposit-taking banks); S. 3217, 111th Cong. (2010), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/
cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills&docid=f:s3217as.txt.pdf (related and now adopted
legislation). Among other things, these include recommendations with respect to: (1) defining high
quality capital and mitigating pro-cyclicality; (2) strengthening accounting standards; (3) reforming
compensation practices; (4) improving OTC derivatives risk management; (5) addressing cross-border
issues and systemically important financial institutions; and (6) strengthening adherence to international
standards.
3. In a press release on progress subsequent to the G-20 London Summit, the Financial Stability
Board (FSB) included the following commitment to promoting adherence to international standards:
“The FSB is developing a system of peer reviews of regulatory and prudential standards and of policies
agreed in the FSB.” Press Release, Fin. Stability Bd., Financial Stability Board Reports on Improving
Financial Regulation (Sept. 25, 2009), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/press/
pr_090925a.pdf. See also FIN. STABILITY BD., OVERVIEW OF PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE
LONDON SUMMIT RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING FINANCIAL STABILITY (2009), available at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_090925a.pdf; FIN. STABILITY BD., PROGRESS
SINCE THE PITTSBURGH SUMMIT IN IMPLEMENTING THE G20 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING
FINANCIAL STABILITY (2009) [hereinafter FSB, PROGRESS SINCE PITTSBURGH], available at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/ r_091107a.pdf?noframes=1.
The FSB is comprised of representatives from twenty-four countries, six international
organizations, and six international standard setters, including Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada,
China, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, the
Republic of Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, the
United Kingdom, the United States of America; the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the
European Central Bank (ECB), the European Commission (EC), the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World Bank; the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the Committee on the Global Financial System
(CGFS), the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS), the International Association of
Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), and the
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). Fin. Stability Bd., Links to FSB
Members, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/members/links.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2010).
In connection with this project the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the FSB
predecessor institution, the Financial Stability Forum, agreed from the outset to support G-20
recommendations in a letter dated November 13, 2008. Fin. Stability Forum & Int’l Monetary Fund,
Joint Letter to the G-20 Ministers and Governors (Nov. 13, 2008), available at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_081113.pdf. In August 2010, citing a proposal
dated August 10, 2010, the Executive Board of the IMF explicitly accepted membership in the FSB. See
INT’L MONETARY FUND, IMF MEMBERSHIP IN THE FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD ¶¶ 9, 17 (2010),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2010/081010.pdf; INT’L MONETARY FUND,
EXECUTIVE BOARD, IMF MEMBERSHIP IN THE FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD (2010), available at
http://www.if.org/external/np/pp/eng/2010/081010a.pdf. More recently, upon announcing publication of
a report on the Intensity and Effectiveness of Systemically Important Financial Institution (SIFI)
Supervision, the FSB stated:
While the [SIFI] recommendations are primarily aimed at making SIFIs less susceptible
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require biennial peer reviews, coupled with IMF assessments, of at least
the G-20 countries for “compliance” with existing key standards and
codes for regulators and supervisors—that is, more aggressive
enforcement through mutual evaluations, peer pressure, and oversight
reviews of the effectiveness of micro-prudential supervisory and
regulatory practices. 4
Undeniably, more alert and more stringent, enforcement of such
global standards, as are currently in place, might have avoided some of
the regulatory failures that led to the current crisis, described by many as
the greatest since the Great Depression.
Undeniably, stronger
enforcement of existing requirements is a laudable goal in and of itself.
The question raised by this Article is, even so, can enforcement of
existing global standards for capital markets as articulated by the
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO),
particularly those related to cooperative information exchange,5 without
to failure, there are also lessons for the supervision of financial institutions more
generally. The FSB has asked standard setters and national authorities to follow up on
these recommendations as they incorporate them into supervisory core principles and
national supervisory frameworks respectively. For several key recommendations,
standard setters and national authorities have been asked to report their progress to the
FSB. FSB thematic peer reviews and IMF/World Bank FSAP [Financial Stability
Assessment Program] assessments will assess national implementation and ongoing
conformity with these higher standards.
Press Release, Fin. Stability Bd., Financial Stability Board Releases Report on Supervisory Intensity and
Effectiveness 2 (Nov. 1, 2010) (The report is available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/
publications/r_101101.pdf). This report does not comprehensively address non-banking, securities
intermediaries.
4. FIN. STABILITY BD., FSB FRAMEWORK FOR STRENGTHENING ADHERENCE TO
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS 1 (2010) [hereinafter FSB FRAMEWORK], available at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_100109a.pdf. Part of this document is republished
in Annex I-C, infra. Cf. JOHN PALMER & CAROLINE CERRUTI, IS THERE A NEED TO RETHINK THE
SUPERVISORY PROCESS? (2009) (prepared for an international conference organized by the World Bank
and Banco de Espana).
5. The FSB also focuses on non-cooperative jurisdictions, with the possible sanction of socalled “name and shame” measures. FSB, PROGRESS SINCE PITTSBURGH, supra note 3, at 10. See FIN.
STABILITY BD., PROMOTING GLOBAL ADHERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND
INFORMATION EXCHANGE STANDARDS 20 (2010) [hereinafter FIN. STABILITY BD., PROMOTING GLOBAL
ADHERENCE], available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_100310.pdf; see also
G-20, Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System (Apr. 2, 2009), available at
http://www.g20.org/Documents/Fin_Deps_Fin_Reg_Annex_020409_-_1615_final.pdf. If there is any
doubt of the power of “grey or black listing,” one need only observe the increasing level of high level
political activity directed to avoiding being on any such list that occurs when jurisdictions are warned of
potential listing in connection with insufficient procedures to combat money-laundering. See, e.g., Colin
Powell, Chairman, N.J. Fin. Servs. Comm’n, Address on Anti-Money Laundering (Nov. 21, 2003),
http://www.jerseyfsc.org/the_commission/general_information/speeches/stepjersey.asp; see also FIN.
STABILITY FORUM, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON OFFSHORE CENTERS (2000), available at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0004b.pdf; Press Release, Fin. Stability Forum,
FSF Reviews Offshore Financial Centres (OFCs) Initiative (Apr. 5, 2004), available at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/press/pr_040405.pdf. The FSB will particularly concern itself
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more—however valuable—be expected to prevent or remedy a future
credit and confidence crisis? And, if not, what actions, such as (1)
enhanced guidance on implementation, (2) addition of more quantitative
measures of compliance, (3) expansion of the standards for cooperative
information sharing, or (4) agreement on particular prophylactic
systemic protections, would be necessary to achieve these goals?
II. BACKGROUND
A. The IOSCO Standards
Prior to June 2010, the securities (capital markets) standards or the
Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation (Principles),
contained three objectives, thirty principles and an annex on the related
laws that are preconditions to robust securities regulation. 6 These were
explained both in an initial document containing the Principles 7 and in a
later-developed Assessment Methodology document relating to their
implementation. 8 At IOSCO’s Annual Meeting in Montreal in June
2010, revisions to the Principles, but not the related texts, were adopted
that acknowledge certain of the points made below. 9 More reforms are
ongoing, with further reporting of these expected in April at IOSCO’s
with the review of those Principles listed in Annex I-C for each financial sector.
6. INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION iiii (2008, originally published in 1998) [hereinafter IOSCO PRINCIPLES], available at
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD265.pdf; Annex I-A, infra. As of the first quarter
of 2011, the FSAP reports on standards and codes (ROSC) continue to be conducted using the 1998 (as
reissued in 2008) Principles. Where the term “Principle” is referred to in the text of this document, it
refers to that Principle as constituted between 1998 and 2010. As a whole these Principles are, referred
to herein as the IOSCO Principles. The new Principles adopted in 2010 are renumbered, so that the
numbers that were previously used for certain Principles have been changed. Principles from 2010 will
be referred to as New Principles and the Principles as a whole will be referred to as 2010 Principles. See
infra note 9.
7. IOSCO PRINCIPLES, supra note 6.
8. INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
IOSCO OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION (2008, originally published in 2003)
[hereinafter IOSCO METHODOLOGY], available at https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/
IOSCOPD266.pdf.
9. The updated 2010 version of the IOSCO Principles (hereinafter referred to as 2010
Principles), contains 38 Principles. The 2010 Principles effectively add nine new Principles in that
former Principles 6 and 7 were consolidated. INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, OBJECTIVES AND
PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION (2010) [hereinafter 2010 PRINCIPLES], available at
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD323.pdf; Annex I-B, infra. These new Principles
relate to hedge funds, credit rating agencies and other evaluators, the conflict prevention process, a
process relative to systemic risk appropriate to the mandate of the regulatory authority, and a process to
review the perimeter or scope of regulatory authority. 2010 PRINCIPLES, supra. While there is currently
no agreed text explaining, or methodology for implementing, the new Principles, discussions are
ongoing within several committees of IOSCO.
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2011 Annual Meeting in South Africa.
The Principles were originally adopted in September 1998 as a policy
response to the Asian financial crisis and became one of the standards
and codes referred to when the financial stability assessment program
for assessing jurisdictions’ regulatory frameworks first began. 10 In
2003, after a painful multi-year joint drafting exercise, IOSCO also
published an extensive Methodology for assessing implementation of the
Principles 11 in an attempt to make the assessments more consistent and
to provide more guidance on what should be deemed to constitute
compliance. In 2004, an e-methodology version of the Methodology
together with some additional instructions, links to relevant IOSCO
reports, and a set of frequently asked questions were adopted and in
2007 these were made public to non-members. 12
The Principles and the Methodology reflect consensus among all the
national authorities representing widely different markets at different
stages of market development that are members of IOSCO, an institution
with over a hundred members from more than a hundred jurisdictions. 13
As of 2007, some seventy-five financial sector assessments for the
securities sector had been conducted and evaluated by the IMF and the
World Bank staff and experts in accordance with the IOSCO
standards. 14 In addition to updates, the IMF and World Bank are now in
10. The Financial Stability Forum originally endorsed twelve Key Standards and Codes. Fin.
Stability Bd., 12 Key Standards for Sound Financial Systems, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/
cos/key_standards.htm (last visited July 24, 2010). The FSB currently cites a broader compendium of
standards and codes on its website. Fin. Stability Bd., Subject Area – Financial Regulation and
Supervision, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/list/fsb_cos_subject_area/tid_99/index.htm (last
visited Sept. 27, 2010); Fin. Stability Bd., Subject Area – Institutional and Market Infrastructure,
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/list/fsb_cos_subject_area/tid_98/index.htm (last visited Sept. 27,
2010); Fin. Stability Bd., Subject Area – Macroeconomic Policy and Data Transparency,
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/list/fsb_cos_subject_area/tid_97/index.htm (last visited Sept. 27,
2010).
11. IOSCO METHODOLOGY, supra note 8.
12. IOSCO, IOSCO E-Methodology Principles, https://www.iosco.org/webmeth_pub/index.cfm
(last visited Sept. 4, 2010); INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, FINAL COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE XXIXTH
ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS (2004),
http://www.iasplus.com/resource/0405iosco.pdf (IOSCO announcing the availability of an emethodology in 2004). The actual methodology was not posted on the non-member portion of the
IOSCO website, however, until 2007.
13. IOSCO,
IOSCO
Historical
Background,
https://www.iosco.org/about/
index.cfm?section=background (last visited Sept. 4, 2010); IOSCO, Ordinary Members of IOSCO,
https://www.iosco.org/lists/display_members.cfm (last visited Sept. 4, 2010) (listing 114 Ordinary
Members).
14. See also the discussion by IMF staff relating to levels of implementation, which raises the
issue of consistent ratings, especially where qualitative judgments on implementation are required. Ana
Carvajal & Jennifer Elliott, Strengths and Weaknesses in Securities Market Regulation: A Global
Analysis 10, 48 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/07/259, 2007), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07259.pdf.
IOSCO also conducts “assisted self-
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the process of completing assessments of those G-20 countries which
have not yet been subject to a Financial Stability Assessment, including
the United States and Indonesia (2009–2010) and China (2011) and
beginning a round of more rigorous evaluations. The assessments are
performed by experienced assessors, 15 including those nominated by
IOSCO, who possess broad knowledge of multiple markets.
The collaborative IOSCO process of standard development and
elucidation is markedly different from that for development of the Basel
core standards for banking supervision, which from the outset, until
recently, were disseminated from the top down by the G-10 major
jurisdictions and which contain certain quantitative measures of
“compliance.” 16 Historically, the canon of the IOSCO Principles, in
recognition of the diversity among securities markets, has been that
there is “often no single correct approach to a regulatory issue.” 17 The
Principles explicitly acknowledge that legislative “and regulatory
structures vary between [and among] jurisdictions and reflect local
market conditions and historical development.” 18
B. What Is Missing? IOSCO Principles and Methodology Set a Sound
Framework But Are Not Helpful on Certain Matters
Relevant to the Crisis
The Principles describe a comprehensive framework for capital
markets regulation that delineates the essential qualities and powers of a

assessments,” which are effectively mutual evaluation exercises. IOSCO, Self-Assessment for
Securities
Regulators:
Instructions
and
Templates,
https://www.iosco.org/webmeth_pub/
Instructions.cfm (last visited Sept. 4, 2010).
15. FIN. STABILITY BD., PROMOTING GLOBAL ADHERENCE, supra note 5, at 8.
16. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) of the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) is the standard setter for banking supervisors and author of the Basel Core Principles
for Bank Supervision. The jurisdictions which currently are members of the BCBS are Argentina,
Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong, SAR, India, Indonesia, Italy,
Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. About the Basel
Committee, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/index.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2011). The present Chairman of the
Committee is Mr. Nout Wellink, President of the Netherlands Bank. Id. The BCBS was twice
expanded in 2009: on March 13 Australia, Brazil, China, Korea, Mexico and Russia were added and on
June 10 Argentina, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey were added. Press Release, Bank
for Int’l Settlements, Expansion of Membership Announced by the Basel Committee (Mar. 13, 2009),
http://www.bis.org/press/p090313.htm; Press Release, Bank for Int’l Settlements, Basel Committee
Broadens Its Membership (June 10, 2009), http://www.bis.org/press/p090610.htm. See also BASEL
COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CORE PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION (2006),
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs129.pdf.
17. IOSCO METHODOLOGY, supra note 8, at 5.
18. IOSCO PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, at 3.
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capital markets regulator; 19 the elements of proper oversight of issuers,
collective investments, intermediaries, and markets; 20 and the
components of an effective enforcement regime. 21 As such, they are
intended to permit the identification of regulatory gaps and deficiencies,
to expose insufficiencies in relevant laws and applicable resources, and
to illustrate what makes national regulators good citizens of the
international community. The Methodology provides an assessment
process using Key Issues and Questions intended to result in a
standardized form of rating as well as preambles and explanatory notes
that provide further content to application of the Principles.
The IOSCO-related assessment exercises, to which countries formerly
voluntarily submitted, have materially improved the power and
independence of regulators, identified and helped to close regulatory
loopholes, and prompted a worldwide race to reform financial
regulation, in particular the capacity to combat cross-border
misconduct. 22
In many ways, despite what is known today about new fragilities in
the financial system, the Principles and the related Methodology seem
remarkably prescient. However, by design and omission, the Principles
have some significant lacunae, particularly in light of recent experience
with respect to the products, transactions, and issues they cover.
Moreover, the Principles were intended to continue to evolve, based
upon regulatory experience and new information developed on markets
and market misconduct, so as to remain capable of achieving their stated
objectives, including protecting investors, maintaining fair, efficient, and
transparent markets, and mitigating systemic risk. 23
19. Id. at i (Principles 1–5, which are “Principles Relating to the Regulator”).
20. Id. at ii–iii (Principles 14–16 (“Principles for Issuers”), 17–20 (“Principles for Collective
Investment Schemes”), 21–24 (“Principles for Market Intermediaries”), 25–30 (“Principles for the
Secondary Market”)).
21. Id. at i–ii (Principles 8–10 (“Principles for Enforcement of Securities Regulation”), 11–13
(“Principles for Cooperation in Regulation”)).
22. Carvajal & Elliott, supra note 14.
23. IOSCO PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, at 3; see also, e.g., id. at 1–2 (relating to the challenges of
technology, globalization, cross-border conduct, interdependencies among products, intermediaries and
regulators and the relationship of “high regulatory standards and effective international cooperation [to]
reduce systemic risk”); id. at 3 (commenting on implementation that speaks of markets being “in a
constant state of development” and that regulation must change “to facilitate and properly regulate [the]
changing markets”); id. at 5–7 (discussing the inter-linkages among objectives, specifically noting that
instability may result from events outside a jurisdiction or across several jurisdictions and the
importance of insolvency legislation); id. at 8 (noting the importance of the regulatory environment and
in particular the legal framework (including Bankruptcy or Insolvency law as referred to in Annex 3) or
pre-conditions); id. at 9 (discussing the potential for inequities or gaps where a product or service
exhibits characteristics associated with securities, banking and insurance); id. at 13 (describing SRO
conflicts where an SRO handles both member and market regulation); id. at 21 (describing the issues
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1. Apparent Gaps
In light of recent events, there are significant gaps in the Principles as
they existed in 1998, for which any remedies intended by the 2010
Principles remain obscure. By their terms, the Principles do not cover
certain ground. For example, although they purport to extend to
derivatives markets, at least listed or regulated derivatives, the
Principles’ text explicitly acknowledges that derivatives, which are
quintessentially global, may require additional measures. 24
The
Principles do not cover private offers or define what a private offer of
securities is. 25 They also treat certain issues, such as governance, antimoney laundering, and clearing and settlement, rather superficially,
deferring to other codes or authorities and not elaborating much on the
particular interests of securities regulators in these issues.26 They do not
related to conglomerates); id. at 24 (addressing the importance of enforcement not just against fraud but
of issuer obligations); id. at 25 (commenting on the reliability of financial information to informed
decision making); id. at 36 (risks from off-balance sheet and unlicensed affiliates); id. at 31 (noting the
difficulty of fair value asset valuation). The foregoing recitation of high level references to regulatory
issues (“principles-based concerns”) that remain startlingly current suggest areas where some
expansions might be made to provide further guidance. The original Principles were articulated under
the guidance and leadership of the three IOSCO Chairs at a Chair Committee level, however, using high
level staff sherpas. Arguably any proposed enhancement of the Principles should receive the same level
of engagement and consistency of attention at this juncture by the high level leaders of IOSCO. This
may be difficult when the responsiveness of existing regulators to many specific matters is under attack
in several jurisdictions.
24. Much of the current crisis response is directed to derivatives, however. As stated by the EU
Commission:
The market for derivatives is global. To ensure an ambitious and convergent
international regulatory outcome, the proposals are in line with the objectives agreed at
the G20 meeting of 25 September 2009. The [European] Commission intends to further
develop the technical details in cooperation with its G20 partners in order to ensure a
coherent implementation of these policies across the globe and thus avoid regulatory
arbitrage. Such cooperation is particularly important with the US, which is also in the
process of designing a new approach to derivatives markets.
Press Release, European Comm’n, Financial Services: Commission Sets Out Future Actions to
Strengthen the Safety of Derivatives Markets (Oct. 20, 2009), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1546&format=HTML&language=EN.
But see EU Hints of Different Approach to U.S. on Banks, MONEYNEWS.COM, Feb. 17, 2010,
http://moneynews.com/InvestingAnalysis/EU-Approach-U-S--Banks/2010/02/17/id/350139
(“According to a briefing note given to finance ministers and obtained by The Associated Press,
European officials ‘expressed their concern that the application of the Volcker rule in the EU may not be
consistent with the current principles of the internal market and universal banking.’”). The Dodd–Frank
legislation adopted in 2010 does include language drawn from the Volcker proposal, but is less
restrictive than originally projected. See, e.g., Editorial, Dodd–Frank Bill’s Volcker Rule a Win for Big
Banks, ATLANTIC, June 25, 2010, http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/06/dodd-frankbills-volcker-rule-a-win-for-big-banks/58747/.
25. See IOSCO PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, at ii (Principles 14–16); IOSCO METHODOLOGY,
supra note 8, at 70–71, 76–77, 82–83 (Explanatory Notes for Principles 14–16).
26. IOSCO PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, at 8, 16, 48 (deferring to the Organization of Economic
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provide definitive measures for evaluating prudential requirements; and,
although new work has been done on cross-border cooperation, 27 nor do
the Principles themselves appear to provide much guidance on the use of
information sharing and cooperative measures for pre-empting and
managing financial disruption and crisis as opposed to after-the-fact
enforcement efforts.
a. The Prudential Gap
Only four of the original Principles—22, 24, 29, and 30—are directly
related to the financial integrity of markets and intermediaries and to the
handling of market disruptions and firm failures from the perspective of
the regulator. For example, Principle 23 speaks to internal controls of
authorized intermediaries, largely looking at the responsibilities of
intermediary management and less extensively at the role of the
regulator. Importantly, the IOSCO Principles do not prescribe a capital
or an accounting methodology other than by a caution to address all
relevant risks 28 and to apply consistent and high level standards.29
Additionally, the Principles do not take a position on the desirability of
compensation arrangements (or safety nets) to cover customer funds in
the event of an intermediary default or on other measures intended to
prevent financial contagion or losses of confidence. 30 The Principles
and Methodology also do not provide much detail on how best to
conduct ongoing surveillance of markets to identify risk factors relevant
to systemic financial disruptions as opposed to identifying misconduct
such as miss-selling, manipulation, and insider trading. Guidance on
how to measure regulatory performance is also quite limited. 31
Thus, the pre-2010 Principles at the basis of the IOSCO assessment of
standards and codes for capital markets arguably do not
Cooperation and Development (OECD) as the governance standard setter, the Financial Action Task
Force (FATF) as the AML/anti-terrorism financing, standard setter, and the work of the Committee on
Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and IOSCO on clearing and settlement); IOSCO
METHODOLOGY, supra note 8. A consultation on refining the clearing and settlement standards
(principles for financial markets infrastructures—FMIs) commenced March 10, 2011.
27. See TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. ON SEC. COMM’NS, PRINCIPLES REGARDING
CROSS-BORDER SUPERVISORY COOPERATION (2010), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/
publicdocumentsIOSCOPD322.pdf.
28. IOSCO METHODOLOGY, supra note 8, at 104–05 (emphasis on Principle 22, Key Issue 3, and
Key Questions 2 and 3).
29. Id. at 82–83 (Principle 16, Explanatory Note).
30. Id. at 128 (Principle 24, stating that such matter should be taken into consideration by
assessors).
31. See Carvajal & Elliott, supra note 14, at 10 (discussing implementation and raising the issue
of consistent ratings, especially where qualitative judgments on implementation are required).
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comprehensively address the identification, measurement, and
mitigation of prudential risks and other potentially systemic
vulnerabilities relevant to crisis prevention and crisis management,
which were at the core of the global community’s current financial
woes. For example:








The amount and quality of capital;
The ratio of short to long term financing;
The appropriate level of regulatory scrutiny of the financial
risk consequences of particular product structures or trading
practices;
The nature of liquidity and means for achieving liquidity in
compromised markets;
The use of leverage and collateral;
The mechanisms whereby financial contagion is transmitted
from the banking to the securities sector and vice versa or
could spread from outside the regulated sector; 32 and
The measurement of risk.

In this regard, the IOSCO Principles could be viewed as lacking
agreed views on certain elements of the regulatory framework, which
could be critical to the resolution and prevention of future crises.
To some, the current crisis was a typical banking crisis deriving
largely from a business model that borrows short, lends long, and relies
on liquidity arrangements not segregation of client assets and money to
return customer/depositor money. For them, the securities-related issues
are largely secondary. Nonetheless, if one is to market enforcement of
the securities core principles as a remedy for crisis, then the content of
the Principles and the related Methodology for applying them should be
reviewed with that objective in mind.
b. The “Outside the Perimeter” 33 Gap
Similarly, the scope of the Principles is limited. Many products and
transactions are intentionally excluded, among them foreign currency,
certain commodities, and bullion 34 as beyond the current jurisdiction of
securities regulators or not subject to regulation under existing
32. Consider, for example, the cash commodity markets or unregulated, so-called “shadowbanking,” markets.
33. 2010 PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, at 4 (New Principle 7 states that “[t]he Regulator should have
or contribute to a process to review the perimeter of regulation regularly.”).
34. IOSCO METHODOLOGY, supra note 8, at 5.
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legislation although potentially within the mandate of such regulators.
The Principles do not treat the particular issues of over-the-counter
(OTC) derivatives, certain wholesale transactions, opaque non-regulated
markets, or so-called hedge funds. 35 Nor do they even touch upon the
potential risks and tribulations related to securitization. Further, while
they do give assessors the capacity to make some judgments as to certain
issues related to private offers, any analysis of when information
asymmetry, for example, can disrupt markets as well as be a conduct of
business 36 issue is mostly absent. Nor has much related work been done
on risk migration or the various synergies for good or ill among various
types of markets, including regulated and unregulated markets.
c. The Information-Sharing Gap
Principles 11–13 are related to information sharing and cooperation.
Significant strides have been made in advancing the extent to which
regulators assist each other (1) to prevent fraudsters from hiding beyond
national borders and (2) to address insider trading and market abuse that
can originate from market participants located outside the jurisdiction of
the market’s establishment or can migrate from the cash to the
derivatives market and vice versa. With the technology revolution and
growth of cross-border business, this type of assistance is increasingly
essential. 37 Steps are now being taken to extend the international
community’s expectation with respect to a regulator’s ability to engage
35. See TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, THE REGULATORY
ENVIRONMENT FOR HEDGE FUNDS: A SURVEY AND COMPARISON 3 (2006), available at
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD226.pdf (exploring whether IOSCO should take a
more active role in regulating hedge funds). The 2010 Principles do address hedge funds. 2010
PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, at 10 (New Principle 28 states that “[r]egulation should ensure that hedge
funds and/or hedge funds managers/advisers are subject to appropriate oversight.”).
36. “Conduct of business” includes such considerations as fair and equitable treatment of clients
and timely delivery of material disclosures.
37. In 2007, Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) reported that it had 150,000 screens located
outside the U.S., and brokers in listed-derivatives typically operate in multiple jurisdictions. In the U.S.,
145 non-US firms operate in the U.S. through Part 30 exemptions. See, e.g., Andrea M. Corcoran,
Regulating Futures Markets, the Evolving Federalist Model, FUTURES INDUSTRY ASS’N MAG.,
May/June 2007, available at http://www.futuresindustry.org/fi-magazinesphome.asp?a=1188; see also
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, List of Foreign Part 30 Exemptions,
http://services.cftc.gov/sirt/ sirt.aspx?Topic=ForeignPart30Exemptions (last visited Feb. 9, 2010). The
National Futures Association (NFA), the only CFTC-registered futures association, processes
applications and maintains information on Part 30-qualified firms—though these processes are currently
under review due to ongoing financial reform. While no aggregate number is on the public website,
NFA reported when queried that 145 firms make use of this exemption which permits reliance for some
purposes on foreign regulators. See 17 C.F.R. § 30.10 (2010); Andrea M. Corcoran, Regulators:
Leadership and Reaction, in 10 ELECTRONIC EXCHANGES: THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION FROM PITS
TO BITS 227 (Michael Gorham & Nidhi Singh eds., 2009).
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in information sharing with views on its more substantive power to
freeze assets and to prevent the sequestration of ill-gotten gains behind
non-cooperative jurisdictional screens. 38
But information shared for enforcement purposes, usually after the
fact of a violation or market disturbance, is not targeted to pre-empting
or remediating crises. While a common bond among regulators,
encouraged by the disciplined process articulated by IOSCO to become
a signatory of the IOSCO Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding
Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of
Information (IOSCO MMOU), 39 to share enforcement information has
markedly reduced the ability to hide the fruits of fraud or market abuse
behind borders, enforcement sharing will not necessarily prevent
systemic risks or other vulnerabilities related to financial failures.
Indeed, at least temporary “forbearance” of enforcement or intervention
(though a disfavored regulatory methodology) is often the most
pragmatic response to preventing potential contagion until the regulator
or supervisor has followed any missing funds and staunched the
bleeding.
International enforcement cooperation as described in the
Principles—even under the IOSCO gold standard—then may not be a
solution to financial crisis. New norms of cooperation other than afterthe-fact sharing are now not merely desirable but critical, and more
guidance is necessary. In recognition, in May of 2010, IOSCO’s
Technical Committee (of basically the G-20 jurisdictions) adopted new
Principles for sharing information for cross-border supervisory purposes,
including a related memorandum of understanding or MOU template. 40
The IOSCO Principles, however, extend to all IOSCO jurisdictions. To
address the need for preventive information sharing, one can expect
38. TECHNICAL COMM. OF IOSCO, AN OVERVIEW OF THE WORK OF THE IOSCO TECHNICAL
COMMITTEE (2007) (“In addressing cross-border fraud, IOSCO has recognised (in its 7 June 2006
Resolution on Cross-border Cooperation to Freeze Assets Derived from Securities and Derivatives
Violations) that the effective enforcement of securities laws and regulations would increase if national
regulators can provide cross-border assistance to a regulator in another jurisdiction in freezing assets
relating to securities violations. At this time, not all IOSCO jurisdictions have sufficient powers to
freeze assets which have derived from fraudulent activities. Therefore, IOSCO has encouraged its
members to examine the legal framework under which they operate and strive to develop mechanisms
by which within their jurisdiction these assets could be frozen.”).
39. INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, MULTILATERAL MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
CONCERNING CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION AND THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION (2002)
[hereinafter IOSCO MMOU], available at www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD126.pdf.
IOSCO requires applicants to become signatories to pass a screening process and has a monitoring
committee that monitors ongoing compliance.
See IOSCO, List of Signatories,
www.iosco.org/library/index.cfm?section=mou_siglist (last visited Feb. 27, 2011) (current signature
list).
40. See TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. ON SEC. COMM’NS, supra note 27.
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increasing interest in, and calls for, the IOSCO-wide Principles to
require so-called “second-generation” (or on-going) information sharing
understandings designed (1) to detect and deter particular risks
proactively and (2) to better measure risks across borders.
Some jurisdictions have already implemented such arrangements. 41
For example, the listed derivatives markets’ regulators have been leaders
in developing, through a number of international meetings in the 1990’s,
some consensus on the types of information that should be shared to
assure appropriate forward-thinking surveillance of markets for
prudential failures as well as market abuses. These separate initiatives
have in the past led to detailed work within IOSCO, although these
initiatives are not used in standards assessments. 42 The broader
41. As an example, see the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) arrangements
with the U.K. Financial Services Authority (UK FSA). U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n,
Memoranda
of
Understanding,
http://www.cftc.gov/International/MemorandaofUnderstanding/
index.htm (last visited July 31, 2010) (noting memorandum of understanding between the CFTC and the
UK FSA); see also Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, U.S. Commodity Futures
Trading Commission and the U.K. Financial Services Authority Sign an MOU to Address Cross-Border
Market Surveillance Concerns (Nov. 20, 2006), available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/
PressReleases/pr5259-06.html (commenting on surveillance sharing). The UK FSA will cede prudential
oversight and take on an enhanced oversight of conduct role commencing in 2011 through 2012. These
changes may result in concomitant changes in existing information sharing arrangements. Such
adjustments were made previously when the Financial Services Authority succeeded the Securities
Investment Board, one of its predecessor agencies.
42. TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, THE APPLICATION OF THE TOKYO
COMMUNIQUÉ TO EXCHANGE-TRADED FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES CONTRACTS (1998) [hereinafter
APPLICATION OF THE TOKYO COMMUNIQUÉ], available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/
IOSCOPD85.pdf. That report states:
In October 1997, regulatory authorities from 16 jurisdictions responsible for
supervising commodity futures markets participated in the Tokyo Commodity Futures
Markets Regulators’ Conference in Tokyo, Japan . . . . At the end of the meeting the
regulators issued the Tokyo Communiqué on Supervision of Commodity Futures Markets
which, among other things, endorsed two guidance papers relating to exchange-traded
derivatives: (1) Guidance on Standards of Best Practice for the Design and/or Review of
Commodity Contracts (‘Design Guidance’); and (2) Guidance on Components of Market
Surveillance and Information Sharing (‘Surveillance Guidance’) (collectively ‘the Tokyo
Guidances’).
APPLICATION OF THE TOKYO COMMUNIQUÉ, supra, at 2.
For example, the Tokyo Communiqué specifically states:
[I]n view of the fact that information is a critical tool for maintaining fair and orderly
markets and ensuring market integrity in non-financial physical delivery markets with
finite supply, . . . market authorities should seek the removal of domestic legal or other
barriers to ensure, consistent with the regulatory framework of each jurisdiction, access
by market authorities to information that permits them to detect and to deter abusive
practices and disorderly conditions in the markets, including access to information that
permits them to identify concentrations of positions and the overall composition of the
market.
TOKYO COMMODITY FUTURES MARKETS REGULATORS’ CONFERENCE (THE TOKYO COMMUNIQUÉ) 9
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relevance of this work is not spelled out in the existing Assessment
Methodology nor is it part of the IOSCO vetting process related to
information sharing. Among other things, these initiatives addressed
issues relative to the design of derivative contracts to assure that they
have economic as well as speculative value and real-time ways to assess
ongoing risks in markets where mutualization of risk through central
counterparties is the typical means of assuring performance and settling
accounts. These initiatives, which address systemic concerns, could be
revisited in the context of equity and over-the-counter markets now in
the context of deepening the usefulness of the IOSCO Principles.
2. Proactive Information Sharing, While Helpful, May Not Be Enough
No matter how good the information sharing regime is, there remains
suspicion among regulators as a group that when there is a problem that
threatens the health of a national institution, the national regulator
addresses its own exposures first before it calls its regulatory
counterparts. 43 Politicians do not receive many plaudits for saving their
neighbors’ citizens from loss, although in light of the increasing
integration of the financial community, perhaps they should.
Consequently, even though enhanced cooperation and proactive
information sharing is desirable, and may provide a better understanding
of interconnected risks and the size of market problems or the
deficiencies in national data, such information sharing may not, in and
of itself, be enough to address market failures where insufficient funds
to satisfy outstanding claims are at stake.
If :
 there is no assurance that any domestic insolvency regime will
provide equivalent protection to all similarly situated market
participants (e.g., with the same class of claim);
 there is an insufficiency of funds to cover all claims;
 an early actor can adversely affect a fair allocation of losses;
(1997), available at http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/commerce/intl/tkyc.pdf. See also TECHNICAL COMM.
IOSCO, GUIDANCE ON INFORMATION SHARING (1997) [hereinafter TECH. COMM., GUIDANCE],
available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD86.pdf.
43. Anecdotally, in the case of the Societé Gènèrale rogue trader, M. Kerviel, some jurisdictions
claimed that the French authorities addressed any potential domestic exposures without informing their
international regulatory confreres until the problem was past. In the case of the Barings collapse,
anecdotally, all futures positions at the then London Financial Futures Exchange (LIFFE) were
transferred before the BOE took up the phone to call American regulatory authorities. Cf. Andrea M.
Corcoran, Markets’ Self-Assessment and Improvement of Default Strategies after the Collapse of
Barings, 2 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 265 (1996). See also Will Acworth, The Lessons of Lehman,
Reassessing Customer Protections, FUTURES INDUSTRY, Jan.–Feb. 2009, available at
http://www.futuresindustry.org/fi-magazine-home.asp?a=1297.
OF
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or
the ability to prevent contagion by moving funds with
positions does not exist;
then: all the enforcement of existing standards, cooperation, and
information sharing in the world will not remedy the difficulty.


3. The Moving Target
The IOSCO Principles were originally written in 1998. The
Methodology was originally published in 2003. To date, the means of
updating these has been to provide footnotes relating to IOSCO reports
that give more content to the high level Principles and that can be
consulted by assessors. 44 Not all of these reports, however, have been
adopted by the full IOSCO. Further, to date, there has been no specific
agreement on when needed guidance ought to be explicitly included in
the Principles or the Methodology. Nor is there any guidance on how to
use the existing footnotes. The new Principles announced in 2010 have
yet to be explicated, though work is ongoing, and do not cover all of the
issues identified here.
4. Capital Markets Issues and the G-20
In a February 2009 press release, after the G-20’s Washington
Summit, IOSCO’s Secretary General indicated that IOSCO recognized
the need to update its program as part of its policy response to the crisis.
He relates how IOSCO was an active participant in identifying new
areas of concentration, stating: “In recognition of its role in the
development of international regulatory standards, IOSCO has also been
invited to participate in two of the G-20 Working Groups—Enhancing
Sound Regulation and Strengthening Transparency; and Financial
Market Integrity and International Cooperation.” 45 He noted that
IOSCO itself had convened three specialist Task Forces to look at: short
44. IOSCO PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, at 2 (“Many of the topics addressed in this document are
already the subject of IOSCO reports or Resolutions. The reports published by IOSCO and the
Resolutions adopted by its membership are also a valuable source of information on the principles that
underlie effective securities regulation and the tools and techniques necessary to give effect to those
principles. This document draws upon those reports as a primary source. IOSCO’s reports generally
provide a more detailed treatment of the particular topic. Reference is made to those reports and
resolutions in the notes to this document and they should be consulted when considering particular
topics. Full copies of the text of reports and resolutions can be obtained from the IOSCO Secretariat.”).
In 2003 and most recently in 2008 the notes referring to other reports in the Principles and the
Assessment Methodology were updated.
45. Greg Tanzer, Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’ns, Increased Co-operation is Essential: IOSCO’s
Response to the G-20 Challenge to Financial Regulators, HEDGE FUND JOURNAL, Feb. 2009.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011

15

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 8
CORCORAN FINAL FORMAT (Paginated)

666

3/18/2011 1:10:11 PM

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

selling; unregulated entities, and unregulated markets and products.46
He concluded that, IOSCO believed that: its “participation in [the G-20]
Working Groups will ensure that the views of securities regulators are
present at the policy formulation stage within the G-20.” 47 In light of
the complications of securitization and various securities markets
products, it is not only beneficial but vital for IOSCO to be a full
participant in the ongoing standards dialogue.
However, there is no corresponding statement yet as to how this work
is projected to be integrated in the existing Methodology.
5. Altering the Canon of Country Specificity
Placing increased reliance on the effectiveness of the execution of the
Principles may put pressure on the former canon within the IOSCO
community that some differences in regulatory tools, techniques, and the
execution of regulatory mandates may be necessary because of
differences in the nature of the assessed markets’ level of development
and in the applicable legal system (common law, civil, etc.). No real
attention beyond the Methodology has been given to how much
flexibility can be tolerated in interpreting the Principles if they are to
result in public ratings that are comparable across jurisdictions or in
equivalent conditions of cross-border competition.
IOSCO’s rating system sets a compliance bar that jurisdictions must
meet. Moving to a stronger view, as has been done with the IOSCO
MMOU, on where consistency is essential will require strength of will
and a better appreciation of precisely where equivalence or convergence
as opposed to harmonization is desired. Determining under which
circumstances jurisdictional differences in approach are not acceptable
may be quite difficult especially where discretion and flexibility remain
necessary to meet market evolutions and allocations of resources.
Nonetheless, as outlined in another context, in order for standards to
work properly and not be gamed or permit unfair competition related to
the costs of capital, some measures may need to be common or
commonly understood and interpreted, even if for others, exemptions,
46. Id. See, e.g., TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, REGULATION OF
SHORT SELLING (2009), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD292.pdf;
TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, HEDGE FUNDS OVERSIGHT (2009), available
at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD293.pdf; TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG.
OF SEC. COMM’NS, UNREGULATED FINANCIAL MARKETS AND PRODUCTS (2009), available at
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD301.pdf; BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION,
REPORT ON SPECIAL PURPOSE ENTITIES (2009), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/
IOSCOPD308.pdf.
47. Tanzer, supra note 45.
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substituted compliance, information sharing, and additional transparency
or disclosure 48 may suffice. For example, international coordination and
cooperation intended to address fair and equitable sharing of losses or
treatment of failing institutions undertaking cross-border business
ultimately may require more convergence to achieve their objectives
than those of better disclosure.
Common understandings of the numbers produced by capital
requirements and accounting also may require more prescription than
discretion. 49 If capital models and measures are idiosyncratic or
disbelieved by the industry or the public, if the data on which they are
based is incomplete or broadly different, or if the data that they produce
is suspect, these seeming flaws could engender inter-jurisdictional
mistrust. In turn mistrust can adversely affect inter-jurisdictional
cooperation and resolution arrangements as well as mutual clearing
commitments or insurance regimes.
Quantitative cross-border
misunderstandings can result in distrust of the efficacy of information
sharing as a mechanism for managing financial or market disruptions
and can prevent or delay regulatory expectations concerning the
practicability of work out or rescue arrangements, such as the transfer of
accounts from failing to solvent institutions. Lack of common
understandings can also call into question the veracity of statements of
financial condition 50 upon which investment, disinvestment, and
48. Consider the very interesting common comment responding to the Committee of European
Securities Regulators (CESR) call for evidence submitted by the EU–US Coalition, including among
others the Futures and Options Association (FOA), the Futures Industry Association (FIA) and the
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA). Response by the EU–US Coalition on
Financial Regulation to the CESR Call for Evidence on Mutual Recognition of Non-EU Jurisdictions
(Sept. 2009) [hereinafter Response], available at http://europe.sifma.org/docs/CommentLetters/
20090916FOA,SIFMA,LIBA,ABASA,BAFT,BBA,FIA,ICMA,IIAC,ISDA,SBA,EBFResponsetoCESR
CEonMutualRecognition.pdf. CESR, since January 1, 2011 has been superseded by the European
Securities Market Authority (ESMA), an authority of the EU. Even though “politics” could take
mutuality discussions off the table for the time being, the discussion in this Article regarding different
means of cooperation along a continuum from increased transparency of the rules and requirements to
complete equivalence or standardization should prompt at least an exercise in mapping whether there is
a difference in how different Principles should be approached.
49. Even before the Lehman Repo 105 use of derivatives to change the look of their financial
condition across a reporting period, such “window dressing,” or “false reporting,” as the case may be
was observed in other contexts and jurisdictions. See Andrew Clark, Lehman Brothers: Repo 105 and
Other Accounting Tricks, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Mar. 12, 2010, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
business/2010/mar/12/lehman-brothers-repo-105-enron (discussing how other companies have used
techniques similar to those used by Lehman Brothers).
50. See, e.g., Daniel Gros, Transparency on Banks’ Balance Sheets?, CTR. FOR EUROPEAN
POL’Y STUDIES, Feb. 12, 2009, available at http://www.ceps.eu/book/transparency-banks-balancesheets; Daniel Gros & Cinzia Alcidi, What Lessons from the 1930’s?, CTR. FOR EUROPEAN POL’Y
STUDIES, Mar. 7, 2009, available at http://www.ceps.eu/book/what-lessons-1930s; Felix Roth, Who Can
be Trusted After the Financial Crisis?, CTR. FOR EUROPEAN POL’Y STUDIES, Nov. 5, 2009, available at
http://www.ceps.eu/book/who-can-be-trusted-after-financial-crisis; see also 2010 PRINCIPLES, supra
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resolution as well as other regulatory decisions are based.
The most disciplined treatment of the common enforcement of
standards at the “granular” level by a peer review process is the current
process for accession to the IOSCO MMOU. The prescribed internal
procedure includes vetting by a screening committee, an application
comment process, an appeal from refusals, and an ongoing group
procedure for monitoring continuing compliance. 51 As of 2010, IOSCO
requires all Member jurisdictions to either become a full signatory of the
MMOU (e.g., an adherent listed in Annex A) or to commit to meet its
terms by seeking necessary legislative change (that is, an adherent listed
in Annex B). All members must accede to Annex A by 2013. 52 The
admirable process applied to MMOU screenings could be emulated in
determining how best to impose more robust requirements on
compliance with other core Principles. The MMOU enlists every
IOSCO member in the community of regulators devoted to clean
markets and fair treatment of customers to meet its stringent criteria. 53
III. THE WAY FORWARD: SUBSTANCE
A. More or Enhanced Guidance on Applying the Principles
In light of the high level nature of the Principles themselves and the
projected expanded role for their enforcement, some gaps or ambiguities
could potentially be remedied and newly pertinent issues could be
addressed, through amendment of the Assessment Methodology or the
production of additional guidance? 54 For example, IOSCO could
note 9 (principles 19 to 23 on auditing, credit rating agencies and evaluators); MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG
SHORT (2010); BETHANY MCLEAN & JOE NOCERA, ALL THE DEVILS ARE HERE: THE HIDDEN HISTORY
OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (2010).
51. Press Release, Int’t Org. of Sec. Comm’ns, IOSCO Completes Framework to Fight CrossBorder Market Abuse (Jan. 22, 2010), available at http://www.iosco.org/news/pdf/
IOSCONEWS176.pdf; Press Release, Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’ns, IOSCO Strengthens International
Cooperation to Fight Illegal Securities and Derivatives Activities (Oct. 16, 2003), available at
http://www.fsa.go.jp/inter/ios/20031016/01.pdf.
52. As of July 31, 2010, there were seventy-one signatories to the IOSCO Multilateral
Memorandum of Understanding. See IOSCO, IOSCO Library Section, www.iosco.org/library/
index.cfm?section=mou_siglist (last visited Sept. 4, 2010). For the Memorandum of Understanding, see
INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, MULTILATERAL MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING: CONCERNING
CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION AND THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION (2002), available at
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD126.pdf.
53. The IOSCO MMOU requirement to commit to delivery of enforcement assistance to other
member signatories is subject only to certain national public policy concerns. Information should be
shared without the need for the violation for which the requesting authority seeks information to breach
the requested authority’s laws. See, e.g., IOSCO MMOU, supra note 39, § 7(c).
54. This does not appear that likely at the moment as the assessment exercise with heightened
focus on compliance with the existing standards has already commenced and there will be a high level
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consider:













covering newly perceived risks, exposures, gaps, and a spectrum of
reasonable regulatory responses within existing or new explanatory
notes;
adding separate guidance to assessors on systemic vulnerabilities
and risk factors that should be covered by securities regulators
under each Principle as relevant;
providing more specific guidance on implementation—such as what
types of evidence to ask for, or measurement activities to undertake
to assess the adequacy of capital requirements or the robustness of
ongoing supervision of regulated entities;
developing specific quantitative and qualitative tests for capital or
tests of performance for accounting principles;
providing examples, taken from assessors or participating
jurisdictions, of specific fact situations where evaluation is
particularly complex, such as independence, resourcing,
accountability, the scope and coverage of supervisory activities, and
how these relate to crisis management and resolution;
providing examples of how financial malfeasance and improper
disclosure can affect not only customer protection but also firm
financial integrity and ultimately economic stability;
adding enhancements related to preconditions, the components of
the essential legal framework or environment essential to assuring
the reliability of the performance of the standards (previously
reputedly rejected by the IOSCO Implementation Task Force (ITF),
the group drafting the Methodology, as too controversial at the
national level because of limitations on the scope of regulatory
authority in these areas);
adding guidance on the nature of accountability firms and their
management and directors should have for compliance; and
taking comments from the IOSCO membership and the public as to
what enhancements would have improved their jurisdictions’ crisis
experiences or how their regulatory experience has affected policy
development.

B. Making Cooperation More Effective
As a matter of substance, post-crisis, all existing cooperative
mechanisms developed by national regulators to address a crisis that
infects institutions and systems beyond its national borders could be
under scrutiny to determine if they are sufficiently broad and targeted
of political interest in the comparability of the assessments in view of the expectations for these, though
new guidance on the revised principles is likely to be issued for consultation in April 2011. See also
Carvajal and Elliott, supra at note 14.
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and the Principles (perhaps the new systemic Principle) 55 should
encourage this process. These include:
 transparency: do current transparency requirements permit
sufficiently timely means to record, aggregate, and manage
cross-border and domestic exposures; are all exposures
included; and are the rules of the game in the event of distress
situations equivalent between insiders and outsiders and
known in advance to the players;
 information sharing: do memoranda of understanding,
colleges of regulators, dialogues, and exchange of specified
information among regulators to supervise institutions
exposed to and in multiple jurisdictions provide sufficiently
timely and useful access to the information necessary to
deliver on the comprehensive supervision promise; are they
effective in practice in deterring as well as sanctioning
conduct; and
 reliance on due diligence and oversight processes of the
licensing jurisdiction: do vetting regimes and sharing of
relevant capital measures and compliance provide sufficient
coverage to avoid financial pandemics, credit gridlock, and
serial malfeasors, or do national jurisdictions need in-country
financial support for the obligations the regulator incurs to
support depositors and to oversee proper regulatory
compliance.
Is now not a time for IOSCO also to further address the following
questions?
 Why, when, and how can one regulator rely on another
regulator or risk assessment provider?
 How can we achieve international consistency of national
laws where consistency is important to systemic safety?
 How can we achieve international consistency of national
laws where national individuality and accountability remain
important to adequate oversight, customer protection, and
education?
 Having spotted the issue of interconnectedness, how can we
better equip national regulators to identify and to address
controlling connection risks while still serving their domestic
customers?
 In that banking and capital markets are risk-connected, other

55. 2010 PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, at 4 (New Principle 6 states that “[t]he Regulator should have
or contribute to a process to monitor, mitigate and manage systemic risk, appropriate to its mandate.”).
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than merely indicating that where banking and securities
authorities oversee the same entity securities regulators must
have a mechanism for exchanging relevant information with
banking supervisors on the supervision of that entity, 56 how
can we set up practical means for more broadly cooperating
across sectors? 57
Having produced specific guidance on the elements of
information sharing for surveillance in some areas, how can
we draw heightened attention to or revise the IOSCO
Information Sharing Guidance, the Boca Declaration, or other
such second generation arrangements to address market
evolution? 58

56. IOSCO METHODOLOGY, supra note 8, at 11–12 (discussing Principle 1).
57. In this respect, note the various proposals to avoid pro-cyclicality that call for reserving
capital in good times and disbursing it in bad. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
58. See TOKYO COMMODITY FUTURES MARKETS REGULATORS’ CONFERENCE (THE TOKYO
COMMUNIQUÉ) (1997), available at http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/commerce/intl/tkyc.pdf; Fin. Stability
Bd., Guidance on Information Sharing, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/cos/cos_980301b.htm
(last visited Sept. 4, 2010); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Declaration on Cooperation and
Supervision of International Futures Markets and Clearing Organisations (Boca Declaration) (1998),
http://www.cftc.gov/International/InternationalInitiatives/oia_bocadec0398.html (last visited Sept. 27,
2010) [hereinafter Boca Declaration]; see also TECH COMM., GUIDANCE, supra note 42. The following
types of information are cited by the Boca Declaration:
1.8. An Authority may make a Request if, within the ordinary course of its existing
supervisory responsibilities, it becomes aware that any of the following events has
occurred with respect to a Member of a Party:
A. A large decrease in Owner’s Equity in any six month period.
B. A Member’s cumulative net Variation Payments over ten consecutive business
days for proprietary and non-customer positions which are unusually large in
relation to the Member’s Owner’s Equity.
C. A Member’s cumulative net Variation Payments over six consecutive months
for proprietary and non-customer positions are unusually large in relation to the
Member’s Owner’s Equity.
D. A Member’s net Variation Payments for customer positions for one business
day which are of unusually large size in relation to the Member’s Owner’s Equity.
E. Total positions in a contract registered in a Member’s name, which represent at
least 50% of the total long or short positions in that contract, the Open Interest of
which is greater than 25,000 but less than 100,000.
F. Total positions in a contract registered in a Member’s name which represent at
least 25% of the total long or short positions in that contract, the Open Interest of
which exceeds 100,000.
G. A Member, Affiliate or a firm or other person with a substantial commercial
relationship to the Member experiences an event that is not listed but in the
opinion of an Authority is of a similar magnitude, and the Authority determines
that it has reasonable grounds to seek information in accordance with Article 3 of
this Declaration.
1.9. In addition, an Authority may make a Request if: (A) there are unusually large price
movements in a market under its jurisdiction and/or unusual price relationships in related
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C. Identifying Where More Guidance, Information Sharing, and
Cooperation Are Not Enough
Placing increased reliance on these standards as mechanisms of crisis
prevention materially raises the stakes on the specific manner in which
the standards are met by each national authority and on how
implementation by each IOSCO member is rated. Such reliance
challenges the expectation that observance by IOSCO member
jurisdictions of the standards as written can help protect against financial
or market disruptions in ways that: (1) promote rather than discourage
open markets; (2) limit unnecessary barriers to cross-border transacting;
and (3) favor consistent, fair interpretation of rules for global as well as
national stakeholders. Failure to make the Principles work more
effectively to deliver financial stability and safety of customer funds
from non-trading related failures could compromise these other
beneficial goals and further atomize rather than draw together the
regulatory community. 59
To the extent it is inherent for national jurisdictions to save
themselves before saving others the incentives behind such conduct
should be recognized. Additionally, there should be discussion of the
need for automatic or prophylactic ways to deal with those risks unlikely
to be mitigated by information sharing and cooperation. Ultimately, if
solutions to financial crises are to cross jurisdictional boundaries
effectively, more prescriptive commonalities, such as common
approaches to defaults, may need to be sought.
These could include seeking broader understanding on:
 margin or leverage limits;
 position or exposure limits;
 use of collateral;
 appropriate and inappropriate ring-fencing;
markets, or (B) it has a reasonable basis to believe that a Member, also subject to the
jurisdiction of another Authority, or such Member’s customer or counterparty, may be
attempting to accumulate an unusually large position which may have a substantial
impact on the price of a contract or may be engaging in abusive activity.
Boca Declaration, supra.
59. For example, John Kay refers to the projected tax-payer referendum in Iceland on March 6.
Icelandic banks had a branch and a subsidiary in the U.K. These banks aggressively raised deposits
from U.K. retail investors. Kay states: “The only satisfactory means of dealing with these problems
requires that banks match their deposits with safe assets ring-fenced within the jurisdiction in which the
deposits are collected. The proposition that better regulation in all 27 member states will in [the] future
prevent cross-border failures of retail banks is risible.” John Kay, Shameful Bullying Should Find Its
Nemesis in Iceland, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Feb. 24, 2010, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/
e69c686a-20e4-11df-b920-00144feab49a.html. The Icelandic public ultimately voted not to take
responsibility for the losses to U.K. investors held by the branch; the U.K. filled the gap.
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when insolvency 60 should be declared;
early warnings;
automatic expansions of collateral upon pre-set moves in the
market;
circuit breakers; and
firm structure and the business model, etc.
IV. THE WAY FORWARD: PROCESS
A. Measuring the Principles Against the Crisis

So assuming that to remain credible some level of enhancement
remains essential, how might IOSCO take the Principles to the next
step?
Preliminarily, a gap analysis should be performed to measure the
Principles against the crisis. What Principles were implicated? How did
the Principles fare in addressing these? Such an analysis might expose,
for example, that:
 National authorities trying to contain the contagion found that
not rescuing a regulated intermediary awarded a government
license to hold customer funds, absent mechanisms to keep
solvent customer’s deposits whole and to wind down, in an
orderly manner, the intermediary where such deposits were
held was not a realistic option. Why? Such action
destabilized confidence in regulated entities more generally
and precipitated runs on deposits and redemptions of
collective investment fund interests. 61 Panicked monetizing
60. Cf. Ross P. Buckley, The Bankruptcy of Nations: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 43 INT’L
LAW 1189 (2009).
61. Rarely in the midst of a crisis is letting depositors bear losses an attractive option or a
desirable policy outcome. For examples, review the following: (1) Although Sweden had no deposit
insurance program, it guaranteed the obligations of all banks, including deposits in 1992 in the midst of
its banking crisis. Peter Englund, The Swedish Banking Crisis: Roots and Consequences, 15 OXFORD
REV. ECON. POL’Y 80, 91–92 (1999), available at http://www.contrahour.com/contrahour/files/
TheSwedishBankingCrisisRootsandConsequences.pdf. (2) For the U.K.’s announcement with respect to
insuring U.K. depositors in the branch of a failing Icelandic bank, see Press Release, HM Treasury,
Statement by the Chancellor on Financial Stability (Oct. 8, 2008), http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/
statement_chx_081008.htm. (3) In May 1984 , the U.S. insured all deposits, notwithstanding deposit
limits, in Continental of Illinois, a bank with largely commercial depositors and the 7th largest bank with
$45 billion in assets. See AN EXAMINATION OF THE BANKING CRISES OF THE 1980’S AND EARLY
1990’S: CONTINENTAL OF ILLINOIS AND ‘TOO BIG TO FAIL’ 2 (1997), available at
www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/235_258.pdf. More recently in the midst of the 2007–2009 crisis,
the Federal Reserve on October 21, 2008 granted a loan of $540 billion to support money market mutual
funds, following an earlier smaller guarantee announced by the U.S. Treasury on September 19. The
media pointed out the vulnerability of the mutual funds to redemptions. See Craig Torres & Christopher
Condon, Fed to Provide up to $540 Billion to Aid Money Funds, BLOOMBERG, Oct. 21, 2008, available
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of assets by the investing public in turn caused a broadening
and deepening of the downward spiral as products were
converted to cash, which in turn accelerated and exacerbated
leveraged institutions’ losses and need to roll over credit
arrangements. Principles 24 and 29 require contingency plans
but little guidance is given as to what these should contain.
The CPSS/IOSCO standards require that customer funds not
be treated as funds of the broker. There is no guidance on
insolvency or compensation funds.
Users of cross-border markets found that their funds were not
retrievable in the manner, time, and amounts expected. Why?
Administration and insolvency schemes were widely
divergent and no globally-respected, market-oriented plan for
promptly addressing the return of positions and funds of
investors was in place. The Principles do not deal with use of
collateral and cross-border retrieval of funds even
conceptually.
Brokers and investment bankers were surprised at the extent
to which certain interconnected risks were opaque or could
expand exponentially. Why? Many did not seem to
understand fully how synthetic and risk transfer products such
as credit default swaps products, had binary risks, and could
multiply leverage effects or how two-way derivatives markets
assure losers for every winner. The Principles do not address
over-the-counter exposures, nor do they address risk
measurement or transparency of all instruments.
Market participants found that they did not know where their
collateral was and that they did not understand the risks of the
products they had purchased. Why? Some customers had had
their collateral re-hypothecated to support or offset dealers’
proprietary trading.
Some customers understandably
substituted the views of presumed independent professional
ratings agencies for their own, less informed due diligence.
The Principles address proper disclosure but not all products
for which disclosure is desirable are within the ambit of

at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ajw94.nC0a5w&refer=home (money
market funds were previously explicitly uninsured). (4) For Ireland’s reaction to the current crisis of
guaranteeing all bank deposits, see Press Release, Ireland Dep’t of Fin., Government Increases Deposit
Guarantee to Euro 100,000 per Depositor (Sept. 20, 2008), available at http://www.finance.gov.ie/
viewdoc.asp?DocID=5466. As the EU Directive provided for 20,000 Euros, it was rumored that this
announcement caused deposits to move to Ireland provoking a debate within the European Union as to
the appropriateness of allowing the level of deposit insurance to be a minimum as opposed to a
maximum harmonization directive.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss2/8

24

Corcoran: GLOBALIZATION REPORT CARDS FOR SECURITIES REGULATORS: NATIONAL EN
CORCORAN FINAL FORMAT (Paginated)

2010]

3/18/2011 1:10:11 PM

GLOBALIZATION REPORT CARDS

675

capital markets regulators disclosure requirements. 62
 Some U.S. proponents of consolidation of the financial
services industry and its regulators abruptly reversed
direction. Why? Because some saw insuperable conflicts
within single institutions; because some feared firms were not
only too big to fail, but also too big to manage or too powerful
to regulate. And, because some, perhaps inadvertently,
promoted policies that would deny governmental support and
attention to non-systemically significant institutions thereby
potentially fostering further consolidation. The Principles do
not address firm structure or market structure or complexity.
 Proponents of a national retreat from gradually moving
toward a more unified international market in financial
services emerged, as did the dread words “protectionism” and
“nationalism.” 63 Rhetoric was flung around, such as “banks
have no social utility,” or particular jurisdictions are “train
wrecks.” Why? This type of regulatory nationalism is a risk
of a belief that any international regulatory regime/philosophy
is incapable of addressing all the specific risks that are
political threats to national authorities and nations. After all,
taxpayers and fiscal policies are national not international.
This gap analysis underscores the risk of relying totally on
compliance with standards, information exchange, and cooperation to
address issues related to burden sharing as to which the Principles offer
no guidance.
B. Developing a Road Map Toward a Solution
Having identified gaps and deficiencies the rest of the process is to
examine what might be the various mechanisms for their remediation.
To this end, the following process is proposed:
First, there should be a mapping exercise to determine where
62. The 2010 PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, do address Credit Rating Agencies at new Principles 22
and 23. New Principle 22 now reads: “Credit rating agencies should be subject to adequate levels of
oversight. The regulatory system should ensure that credit rating agencies whose ratings are used for
regulatory purposes are subject to registration and ongoing supervision.” Id. at 9. New Principle 23
reads: “Other entities that offer investors analytical or evaluative services should be subject to oversight
and regulation appropriate to the impact their activities have on the market or the degree to which the
regulatory system relies on them.” Id.
63. Response, supra note 48, § 2.6 (“In its Communication, ‘Driving European Recovery’ (4th
March 2009), the European Commission emphasized that ‘protectionism and a retreat towards national
markets could only lead to stagnation, a deeper and longer recession and lost prosperity’ (page 11) and
that ‘an unequivocal message is essential to hold off these threats’ (i.e. ‘domestic pressure to apply
restrictive measures’)”).
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effective cooperation and prevention of market and firm disruption can
be maximized by transparency, comparability, equivalence, and reliance.
Second, existing measures for combating contagion from an
unhealthy to a healthy institution should be surveyed, for example: the
Windsor Declaration, 64 the Boca Declaration (with specific information
exchange points), and the Tokyo Communiqué, supra; various regimes
for protection of customer assets, including segregation, insurance or
other compensation schemes; liquidity facilities, including ad hoc
facilities; market protective insolvency regimes, including provision for
portability of accounts; and certain private sector systems for better
understanding cumulative risks, such as the old Chicago Mercantile
Exchange (SAFE) system that aggregated data on exposures including
margin surpluses and deficits across markets and compared information
on trends and differences in excess of specified tolerances on a daily,
weekly, monthly, bi-yearly, and yearly basis.
Third, determine what, if any, incentives/best practices are, or should
be, in place for regulated entities to protect themselves from financial
loss or mispricing risks due to incomplete information, such as through
trader mis-recording or late confirmation of trades.
Fourth, review existing IOSCO guidance on information necessary to
address firm and market disruptions, especially with relation to large
market moves, and update that guidance based on a review of the
various existing surveillance regimes for market disruption across
markets.
Fifth, develop a library of case studies on vulnerabilities experienced
in various jurisdictions and the policy responses thereto.
Sixth, develop more guidance on implementation of the Principles,
including any additional principles intended to address the issues not
currently covered, with examples.
Seventh, share information with other sectoral regulators, including
banking, insurance, pensions, and compensation schemes, on IOSCO’s
results.
Eighth, conduct crisis scenario exercises, including cross-sectoral
scenario exercises, to expose unexpected vulnerabilities, including
technological vulnerabilities.
Ninth, further cultivate informal networking among regulators and
standard setters but expand this to cross-sectoral (banking, insurance,
securities, and any other non-banking financial institutions) networking.
Tenth, develop an internal review or appellate process for debating
and resolving issues related to key Principle compliance.

64. This is attached as Annex II.
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An action plan along the foregoing lines should move the process
within IOSCO toward meeting the promise that the Principles were to be
an evolving, living framework that responds to changes in the
environment. It would also help to assure that compliance with
international standards buttresses regulatory, national and international
resilience to meet ongoing and future financial stresses and strains.
Some of these issues are already firmly on the table, but more
progress could be made. 65
V. CONCLUSION
Despite improvement in the markets and the economy, the markets
remain fragile and repairing the financial system remains an urgent
priority. The financial services industry is a major employer and, when
held properly accountable to the public, an engine of economic wealth.
And a lot is at stake.
It is important that planned remedial actions do not delude us into
thinking an unsolved problem is solved. Cooperation alone cannot
succeed without recognition of the public policy interests of national
jurisdictions and strong national enforcement of the requirements
relating to individual institutions and jurisdictions. Cooperation cannot
succeed where institutions distrust available information, suspect that
needed information exchange will not occur in a timely fashion, 66 or
where there are insufficient assets to satisfy all creditors and so-called
burden-sharing among jurisdictions and stakeholders is unavoidable.
Cooperation without more will not resolve the issue of disputed claims
to the same capital, inconsistent measurements of risk and liquidity,
inter-related exposures that are opaque, or the design of contracts that
take advantage of junior lenders, have unvalued optionality, or cause
perverse incentives.
Many of the standards, not just the IOSCO standards, as they stand
may not really speak to these types of vulnerabilities in a comprehensive
65. TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. ON SEC. COMM’NS, MITIGATING SYSTEMIC RISK: A
ROLE FOR SECURITIES REGULATORS (2011), available at https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/
IOSCOPD347.pdf.
66. The CFTC Part 30 exemption required requesting foreign broker dealers to be sponsored by a
regulatory (or private regulatory) authority, consent to jurisdiction in the U.S., limits direct operations,
trade in only non-U.S. derivatives, certify (and have their sponsoring jurisdiction certify) that they
would not be barred from recognition in the U.S. by U.S. statutory disqualification or fitness standards,
provide for dispute resolution arrangements that are convenient for U.S. customers, assure the proper
treatment of customer funds, and provide disclosure that the operative regulatory requirements might not
be identical to those in the U.S. 17 C.F.R. § 30, App. A (2010). Such arrangements, in place since 1989,
should be models for increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of oversight of entities where crossborder transacting is permitted.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011

27

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 8
CORCORAN FINAL FORMAT (Paginated)

678

3/18/2011 1:10:11 PM

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

way. Efforts should be made to more clearly identify and address, or
indicate where there is no intention to address, these limitations. If great
expectations for the standards are maintained by the political community
and these are disappointed in fact by regulators, the consequences are
unlikely to be good. These known in advance limitations could prevent
broader needed reform or taint other clearly worthwhile cooperative
initiatives, such as access and other arrangements that depend on
cooperative information sharing. 67 It would be a pity if the consequence
of potential failures due to the known limits of cooperative measures
might cause needed, operating cooperative measures to address crossborder activities by entities supervised by non-national supervisors or
their customers to be eschewed. It would be unfortunate indeed if a
failure to enhance or to define the limits of the Principles, caused the
proposed remedies for this crisis to be perceived as the generator of the
next.

67. The EU Passport, the CFTC Part 30 regime, and various recognitions regimes, in
jurisdictions as dispersed as Australia and Canada, acknowledge that a regulator may have superior
access to information (capital, probity) about its own nationals than the regulator of another jurisdiction
in which that national seeks to engage in cross-border operations, and concomitantly that the
jurisdictions that grants access may have superior information about business done in that jurisdiction
than the national regulator. The National Futures Association (a self-regulatory authority with quasigovernmental status) operates a system which automatically pushes out information on changes in
regulatory status of firms that are licensed here that have been admitted into other jurisdictions based on
their U.S. license. See Nat’l Futures Ass’n, Who We Are, http://www.nfa.futures.org/NFA-aboutnfa/index.HTML (last visited July 31, 2010). Currently ten jurisdictions take advantage of this system.
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Annex I-A: IOSCO Principles as of 1998 68
A. Principles Relating to the Regulator
1 The responsibilities of the regulator should be clear and objectively
stated.
2 The regulator should be operationally independent and accountable
in the exercise of its functions and powers.
3 The regulator should have adequate powers, proper resources and
the capacity to perform its functions and exercise its powers.
4 The regulator should adopt clear and consistent regulatory
processes.
5 The staff of the regulator should observe the highest professional
standards including appropriate standards of confidentiality.
B. Principles for Self-Regulation
6 The regulatory regime should make appropriate use of SelfRegulatory Organizations (SROs) that exercise some direct oversight
responsibility for their respective areas of competence, to the extent
appropriate to the size and complexity of the markets.
7 SROs should be subject to the oversight of the regulator and should
observe standards of fairness and confidentiality when exercising
powers and delegated responsibilities.
C. Principles for the Enforcement of Securities Regulation
8 The regulator should have comprehensive inspection, investigation
and surveillance powers.
9 The regulator should have comprehensive enforcement powers.
10 The regulatory system should ensure an effective and credible use
of inspection, investigation, surveillance and enforcement powers and
implementation of an effective compliance program.

68. The following material is copied from IOSCO PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, at i–iii.
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D. Principles for Cooperation in Regulation
11 The regulator should have authority to share both public and nonpublic information with domestic and foreign counterparts.
12 Regulators should establish information sharing mechanisms that
set out when and how they will share both public and non-public
information with their domestic and foreign counterparts.
13 The regulatory system should allow for assistance to be provided
to foreign regulators who need to make inquiries in the discharge of their
functions and exercise of their powers.
E. Principles for Issuers
14 There should be full, timely and accurate disclosure of financial
results and other information that is material to investors’ decisions.
15 Holders of securities in a company should be treated in a fair and
equitable manner.
16 Accounting and auditing standards should be of a high and
internationally acceptable quality.
F. Principles for Collective Investment Schemes
17 The regulatory system should set standards for the eligibility and
the regulation of those who wish to market or operate a collective
investment scheme.
18 The regulatory system should provide for rules governing the
legal form and structure of collective investment schemes and the
segregation and protection of client assets.
19 Regulation should require disclosure, as set forth under the
principles for issuers, which is necessary to evaluate the suitability of a
collective investment scheme for a particular investor and the value of
the investor’s interest in the scheme.
20 Regulation should ensure that there is a proper and disclosed basis
for assets valuation and the pricing and the redemption of units in a
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collective investment scheme.
G. Principles for Market Intermediaries
21 Regulation should provide for minimum entry standards for
market Intermediaries.
22 There should be initial and ongoing capital and other prudential
requirements for market intermediaries that reflect the risks that the
intermediaries undertake.
23 Market intermediaries should be required to comply with
standards for internal organization and operational conduct that aim to
protect the interests of clients, ensure proper management of risk, and
under which management of the intermediary accepts primary
responsibility for these matters.
24 There should be procedures for dealing with the failure of a
market intermediary in order to minimize damage and loss to investors
and to contain systemic risk.
H. Principles for the Secondary Market
25 The establishment of trading systems including securities
exchanges should be subject to regulatory authorization and oversight.
26 There should be ongoing regulatory supervision of exchanges and
trading systems which should aim to ensure that the integrity of trading
is maintained through fair and equitable rules that strike an appropriate
balance between the demands of different market participants.
27 Regulation should promote transparency of trading.
28 Regulation should be designed to detect and deter manipulation
and other unfair trading practices.
29 Regulation should aim to ensure the proper management of large
exposures, default risk and market disruption.
30 Systems for clearing and settlement of securities transactions
should be subject to regulatory oversight, and designed to ensure that
they are fair, effective and efficient and that they reduce systemic risk.
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Annex I-B: IOSCO Principles as of June 2010 69
A. Principles Relating to the Regulator
1 The responsibilities of the Regulator should be clear and
objectively stated.
2 The Regulator should be operationally independent
accountable in the exercise of its functions and powers.

and

3 The Regulator should have adequate powers, proper resources and
the capacity to perform its functions and exercise its powers.
4 The Regulator should adopt clear and consistent regulatory
processes.
5 The staff of the Regulator should observe the highest professional
standards, including appropriate standards of confidentiality.
6 The Regulator should have or contribute to a process to monitor,
mitigate and manage systemic risk, appropriate to its mandate.
7 The Regulator should have or contribute to a process to review the
perimeter of regulation regularly.
8 The Regulator should seek to ensure that conflicts of interest and
misalignment of incentives are avoided, eliminated, disclosed or
otherwise managed.
B. Principles for Self-Regulation
9 Where the regulatory system [regime should] makes [appropriate]
use of Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs) that exercise some direct
oversight responsibility for their respective areas of competence, [to the
extent appropriate to the size and complexity of the markets] such SROs
should be subject to the oversight of the Regulator and should observe
standards of fairness and confidentiality when exercising powers and
delegated responsibilities. 70
69. The following material is copied from 2010 PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, at 4–12. Italics
represent additions to the 1998 text, and brackets represent deletions.
70. New Principle 9 combines former Principles 6 and 7. See 2010 PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, at
5. Former Principle 6 read: “The regulatory regime should make appropriate use of Self-Regulatory
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C. Principles for the Enforcement of Securities Regulation
10 The Regulator should have
investigation and surveillance powers.

comprehensive

inspection,

11 The Regulator should have comprehensive enforcement powers.
12 The regulatory system should ensure an effective and credible use
of inspection, investigation, surveillance and enforcement powers and
implementation of an effective compliance program.
D. Principles for Cooperation in Regulation
13 The Regulator should have authority to share both public and nonpublic information with domestic and foreign counterparts.
14 Regulators should establish information sharing mechanisms that
set out when and how they will share both public and non-public
information with their domestic and foreign counterparts.
15 The regulatory system should allow for assistance to be provided
to foreign Regulators who need to make inquiries in the discharge of
their functions and exercise of their powers.
E. Principles for Issuers
16 There should be full, accurate and timely disclosure of financial
results, risk and other information which [that] is material to investors’
decisions.
17 Holders of securities in a company should be treated in a fair and
equitable manner.
18 Accounting [and auditing] standards used by issuers to prepare
financial statements should be of a high and internationally acceptable
quality.

Organizations (SROs) that exercise some direct oversight responsibility for their respective areas of
competence, to the extent appropriate to the size and complexity of the markets.” IOSCO PRINCIPLES,
supra note 6, at i.
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F. Principles for Auditors, Credit Ratings Agencies, and other
information service providers
19 Auditors should be subject to adequate levels of oversight.
20 Auditors should be independent of the issuing entity that they
audit.
21 Audit standards should be of a high and internationally
acceptable quality.
22 Credit rating agencies should be subject to adequate levels of
oversight. The regulatory system should ensure that credit rating
agencies whose ratings are used for regulatory purposes are subject to
registration and ongoing supervision.
23 Other entities that offer investors analytical or evaluative services
should be subject to oversight and regulation appropriate to the impact
their activities have on the market or the degree to which the regulatory
system relies on them.
G. Principles for Collective Investment Schemes
24 The regulatory system should set standards for the eligibility, [and
the regulation] governance, organization and operational conduct of
those who wish to market or operate a collective investment scheme.
25 The regulatory system should provide for rules governing the
legal form and structure of collective investment schemes and the
segregation and protection of client assets.
26 Regulation should require disclosure, as set forth under the
principles for issuers, which is necessary to evaluate the suitability of a
collective investment scheme for a particular investor and the value of
the investor’s interest in the scheme.
27 Regulation should ensure that there is a proper and disclosed basis
for asset valuation and the pricing and the redemption of units in a
collective investment scheme.
28 Regulation should ensure that [there is a proper and disclosed
basis for asset valuation and the pricing and the redemption of units in a
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collective investment scheme] hedge funds and/or hedge funds
managers/advisers are subject to appropriate oversight.
H. Principles for Market Intermediaries
29 Regulation should provide for minimum entry standards for
market intermediaries.
30 There should be initial and ongoing capital and other prudential
requirements for market intermediaries that reflect the risks that the
intermediaries undertake.
31 Market intermediaries should be required to [comply] establish an
internal function that delivers compliance with standards for internal
organization and operational conduct, [that] with the aim [to] of
protecting the interests of clients and their assets and ensuring proper
management of risk, [and under] through which management of the
intermediary accepts primary responsibility for these matters.
32 There should be procedures for dealing with the failure of a
market intermediary in order to minimize damage and loss to investors
and to contain systemic risk.
I. Principles for Secondary Markets
33 The establishment of trading systems including securities
exchanges should be subject to regulatory authorization and oversight.
34 There should be ongoing regulatory supervision of exchanges and
trading systems which should aim to ensure that the integrity of trading
is maintained through fair and equitable rules that strike an appropriate
balance between the demands of different market participants.
35 Regulation should promote transparency of trading.
36 Regulation should be designed to detect and deter manipulation
and other unfair trading practices.
37 Regulation should aim to ensure the proper management of large
exposures, default risk and market disruption.
38 [Systems for clearing and settlement of securities] Securities

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011

35

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 8
CORCORAN FINAL FORMAT (Paginated)

686

3/18/2011 1:10:11 PM

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

settlement systems and central counterparties should be subject to
regulatory [oversight, and] and supervisory requirements that are
designed to ensure that they are fair, effective and efficient and that they
reduce systemic risk.
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Annex I-C: FSB Cooperation Standards List 71
Regulatory and supervisory standards concerning international
cooperation and information exchange
There are three key standards in the financial regulatory and
supervisory area: the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking
Supervision, the IAIS Insurance Core Principles, and the IOSCO
Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation. The FSB in
consultation with the BCBS, IAIS and IOSCO identified, within each of
these standards, principles concerning international cooperation and
information exchange. This built on earlier work by the Financial
Stability Forum to identify a list of standards for priority
implementation.
The principles listed below were selected based on two criteria:
principles that relate directly to cooperation and information exchange,
and principles that relate to essential supervisory powers and practices,
without which effective cooperation and information exchange cannot
take place. While the issues covered by some of the principles listed
below are broader than cooperation and information exchange, these
principles are the most relevant to the focus of the FSB. Principles that
solely or mainly concern cooperation and information exchange in the
areas of tax, anti-money laundering or combating the financing of
terrorism were excluded because adherence to these is evaluated by
other international bodies, notably the OECD and FATF.
Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (BCBS)
Licensing and Structure
3. Licensing criteria: The licensing authority must have the power to
set criteria and reject applications for establishments that do not meet the
standards set. The licensing process, at a minimum, should consist of an
assessment of the ownership structure and governance of the bank and
its wider group, including the fitness and propriety of Board members
and senior management, its strategic and operating plan, internal
controls and risk management, and its projected financial condition,
including its capital base. Where the proposed owner or parent
organisation is a foreign bank, the prior consent of its home country
supervisor should be obtained.
71. The following material is copied from FSB FRAMEWORK, supra note 4, at 6–8 (internal
citations and footnotes omitted).
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Methods of Ongoing Banking Supervision
21. Supervisory reporting: Supervisors must have a means of
collecting, reviewing and analysing prudential reports and statistical
returns from banks on both a solo and a consolidated basis, and a means
of independent verification of these reports, through either on-site
examinations or use of external experts.
Consolidated and cross-border banking supervision
24. Consolidated supervision: An essential element of banking
supervision is that supervisors supervise the banking group on a
consolidated basis, adequately monitoring and, as appropriate, applying
prudential norms to all aspects of the business conducted by the group
worldwide.
25. Home-host relationships: Cross-border consolidated supervision
requires cooperation and information exchange between home
supervisors and the various other supervisors involved, primarily host
banking supervisors. Banking supervisors must require the local
operations of foreign banks to be conducted to the same standards as
those required of domestic institutions.
Insurance Core Principles and Methodology (IAIS)
The supervisory system
5. Supervisory cooperation and information sharing: The
supervisory authority cooperates and shares information with other
relevant supervisors subject to confidentiality requirements.
The supervised entity
6. Licensing: An insurer must be licensed before it can operate within a
jurisdiction. The requirements for licensing are clear, objective and
public.
7. Suitability of persons: The significant owners, board members,
senior management, auditors and actuaries of an insurer are fit and
proper to fulfil their roles. This requires that they possess the
appropriate integrity, competency, experience and qualifications.
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Ongoing supervision
17. Group-wide supervision: The supervisory authority supervises its
insurers on a solo and a group-wide basis.
Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation (IOSCO)
B. Principles for the Enforcement of Securities Regulation
8. The regulator should have comprehensive inspection, investigation
and surveillance powers.
9. The regulator should have comprehensive enforcement powers.
10. The regulatory system should ensure an effective and credible use
of inspection, investigation, surveillance and enforcement powers and
implementation of an effective compliance program.
D. Principles for Co-operation in Regulation
11. The regulator should have authority to share both public and nonpublic information with domestic and foreign counterparts.
12. Regulators should establish information sharing mechanisms that
set out when and how they will share both public and non-public
information with their domestic and foreign counterparts.
13. The regulatory system should allow for assistance to be provided to
foreign regulators who need to make inquiries in the discharge of their
functions and exercise of their powers.
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Annex II: Windsor Declaration 72
Representatives of Regulatory Bodies from 16 Countries
Responsible for Supervising the Activities of the World’s Major
Futures and Options Markets (collectively, the “Authorities”) met
on 16 and 17 May 1995 at Windsor in the United Kingdom and
determined to Issue the Windsor Declaration.
...
THE AUTHORITIES reviewed recent developments in, and discussed
the regulatory implications of, the increasing volume of cross-border
transactions on international futures and options exchanges increasingly
linked by common members and participants and similar products.
THE AUTHORITIES took note of previous work on international
regulatory co-operation and exchanged views on specific co-operative
measures to strengthen regulatory supervision, minimise systemic risk
and enhance customer protection with a view to preventing or containing
the adverse effects of financial disruptions. In particular, they addressed
issues related to:





Co-operation between market authorities
Protection of customer positions, funds and assets
Default procedures
Regulatory co-operation in emergencies

THE AUTHORITIES noted that these are issues of importance to all
futures and options exchanges, and clearing houses (collectively,
“markets”) in consequence of which:
I. THE AUTHORITIES REACHED THE FOLLOWING POINTS
OF CONSENSUS
That increasingly, members of one market or companies materially
associated with such members, trade for themselves or customers in
multiple jurisdictions. Mechanisms should be in place to ensure that
enhanced co-operation and communications occurs as necessary
72. The following material is copied from U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm.,
International
Initiatives:
Windsor
Declaration,
http://www.cftc.gov/International/
InternationalInitiatives/oia_windsordeclaration.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2010) (internal footnotes
omitted).
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between regulators and/or market authorities to minimise the adverse
consequences of market disruptions caused by defaults or other failures.
This is because an individual regulator or market authority alone may
not have information on all material exposures of market members,
financial intermediaries and any materially associated companies.
ACCORDINGLY, the Authorities will support, subject to appropriate
confidentiality protections, mechanisms to improve prompt
communication of information relevant to material exposures and other
regulatory concerns.
That protection of customer positions, funds and assets carried by
financial intermediaries plays an important role in customer protection
and the reduction of the potential for systemic risk. ACCORDINGLY,
the Authorities will review the adequacy of existing arrangements to
minimise the risk of loss through insolvency or misappropriation and
enhance such arrangements as appropriate.
That effective exchange and clearing house default procedures coupled
with other regulatory measures, such as effective margining systems,
can mitigate the risk of losses arising from the inability of solvent
participants to close out or manage their exposures to a failing market
member and the consequent potential for systemic failure.
ACCORDINGLY, the Authorities, cognisant of national insolvency
regimes, will promote as appropriate national provisions and market
procedures that facilitate the prompt liquidation and/or transfer of
positions, funds and assets, from failing members of futures exchanges.
That recent market developments require effective international coordination and timely communication of reliable information which is
essential for supervisory purposes when a financial intermediary, a
market member, or a market experiences material financial or
operational difficulties. ACCORDINGLY, the Authorities will support
measures to enhance emergency procedures at financial intermediaries,
market members and markets and to improve existing mechanisms for
international co-operation and communication among market authorities
and regulators.
II. THE AUTHORITIES AGREED TO PROMOTE



Active surveillance within each jurisdiction of large exposures
by market authorities and/or regulators as appropriate.
Development of mechanisms to ensure that customer
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positions, funds and assets can be separately identified and
held safe to the maximum extent possible and in accordance
with national law.
Enhanced disclosure by the markets of the different types and
levels of protection of customer funds and assets which may
prevail, particularly when they are transferred to different
jurisdictions, including through omnibus accounts.
Record-keeping systems at exchanges and clearing houses
and/or market members which ensure that positions, funds
and assets to be treated as belonging to customers can be
satisfactorily distinguished from other positions, funds and
assets.
Enhanced disclosure by markets to participants of the rules
and procedures governing what constitutes a default and the
treatment of positions, funds and assets of member firms and
their clients in the event of such a default.
The immediate designation by each regulator of a contact
point for receiving information or providing other assistance
to other regulators and/or market authorities and the means to
assure twenty-four hour availability of contact personnel in
the event of disruption occurring at a financial intermediary,
market member or market.
Review of existing lists and assuring maintenance by IOSCO
of an international regulatory contracts list.
The development by financial intermediaries, market
members or markets and regulatory authorities of contingency
arrangements, or a review of the adequacy of existing
arrangements, and enhancement as appropriate.

III. THE AUTHORITIES RECOMMENDED THAT FURTHER
WORK SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN IN THE APPROPRIATE
INTERNATIONAL BODIES TO CONSIDER
1. With respect to co-operation between market authorities:
A survey of current procedures for identifying large exposures in
individual markets;
The type of information which may assist regulators and markets to
evaluate the exposure of market members, financial intermediaries and
any materially associated companies;
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The circumstances, including triggers or thresholds, for obtaining such
information;
Mechanisms whereby large exposure and other relevant information is
and could be shared on a bilateral or multilateral basis among regulators
and markets;
Arrangements to ensure confidentiality and that such information is used
solely for the regulatory purpose for which it was provided; and
Arrangements to strengthen the regulatory oversight of financial groups
operating internationally.
2. With respect to protection of customer positions, funds and
assets:
The current types and levels of protection in different jurisdictions with
respect to customer funds and assets; how best to facilitate better and
more consistent protection among jurisdictions; and how best to assure
continued protection when funds and assets are transferred to another
intermediary or jurisdiction or held in a bank affiliated with the
intermediary;
The development of best practices with regard to: the treatment of
customer positions, funds and assets and how they are distinguished
from intermediary’s own positions, funds and assets, including when
held in omnibus accounts, with a view to maximising the safety of those
funds and assets; and
The development of best practices with regard to risk management for
the protection of the intermediary.
3. With respect to default procedures:
The development of best practices by market authorities with regard to
the treatment of positions and funds in the event of a financial disruption
at a member firm so as to permit the prompt isolation of the problem at
the failing firm;
The development of best practices with regard to the handling of
customer positions, funds and assets held in omnibus accounts at
markets in the event of a default;
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The development of standards for information to be made available to
customers as to the default and assessment procedures of markets;
The establishment of means whereby information can efficiently and
effectively be communicated by the relevant market authorities to
market participants in the event that default procedures are
implemented; and
The types of arrangements that might apply in the event that the position
to be liquidated by a market is of a size that threatens the stability of the
market.
4. With respect to regulatory co-operation in emergencies:
The development of best practices for control and management of a
significant business disruption by financial intermediaries, market
members and markets.
The Chairman of the Technical Committee of IOSCO and the
Secretary General of IOSCO, who attended the Windsor meeting,
endorsed the proposal to take matters forward promptly under the
auspices of IOSCO, in close consultation with the markets and market
authorities.
The Authorities Further Agreed That the work identified above
should begin immediately through the Technical Committee of IOSCO.
The Chairmen of the Securities Investments Board and Commodity
Futures Trading Commission have been invited to report interim
progress at the next meeting of the Technical Committee in Paris on 9
and 10 July.
ANNEX I LIST OF AUTHORITIES ATTENDING WINDSOR
MEETING
Australia
Australian Securities Commission
Brazil
Comissão de Valores Mobiliàrios
Canada
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Commission des Valeurs Mobilières du Québec
Ontario Securities Commission
France
Commission des Opérations de Bourse
Germany
Bundesaufsichtsamt für den Wertpapierhandel
Hong Kong
Securities and Futures Commission
Italy
Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa
Japan
Securities Bureau of the Ministry of Finance
Netherlands
Securities Board of the Netherlands
Singapore
The Monetary Authority of Singapore
South Africa
Financial Services Board
Spain
Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores
Sweden
Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority
Switzerland
The Federal Banking Commission
United States of America
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Securities and Exchange Commission
United Kingdom
Securities and Investments Board
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ANNEX II
Particular note was taken of the following reports produced by IOSCO’s
Technical Committee:





Principals for the Supervision of Financial Conglomerates
(October 1992).
Mechanisms to Enhance Open and Timely Communication
between Market Authorities of Related Cash and Derivative
Markets during Periods of Market Disruption (October 1993).
Operational and Financial Risk Management Control
Mechanisms for the Over the Counter Derivatives Activities
of Regulated Securities Firms (July 1994).
Framework for Supervisory Information about the Derivatives
Activities of Banks and Securities Firms (Joint Paper with the
Basle Committee of Banking Supervision (May 1995)).
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